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Abstract
Background: The participation of vulnerable patients in clinical research poses apparent ethical dilemmas.
Depending on the nature of the vulnerability, their participation may challenge the ethical principles of autonomy,
non-maleficence, or justice. On the other hand, non-participation may preclude the building of a knowledge base
that is a prerequisite for defining the optimal clinical management of vulnerable patients. Such clinical uncertainty
may also incur substantial economic costs.
Main text: We present the participation of pre-menopausal women with atrial fibrillation in trials of novel oral
anticoagulant drugs as a case study. Due to their non-participation in pivotal trials, it is uncertain whether for them,
the risks that are associated with these drugs are outweighed by the advantages compared with conventional
treatment. We addressed the question whether research of this new class of drugs in this subgroup would be
appropriate from both, an ethical as well an economic perspective. We used the method of specifying norms as a
wider framework to resolve the apparent ethical dilemma, while incorporating the question whether research of
oral anticoagulants in premenopausal women with atrial fibrillation can be justified on economic grounds. For the
latter, the results of a value-of-information analysis were used.
Conclusions: Further clinical research on NOACs in premenopausal women with atrial fibrillation can be justified
on both, ethical and economic grounds. Addressing apparent ethical dilemmas by invoking a method such as
specifying norms can improve the quality of public practical reasoning. As such, the method should also prove
valuable to committees that have formally been granted the authority to review trial protocols and proposals for
scientific research.
Keywords: Vulnerable patients, Clinical trials, Specifying norms, Novel drugs, Value of information analysis, Clinical
uncertainty
Background
The ethics of clinical research depends on the fulfillment
of requirements that result from values such as respect
for autonomy and welfare of research subjects, non-
maleficence, and optimal use of scarce resources [1]. In
concrete situations, such requirements can be mutually
conflicting. For instance, subjects who are eligible based
on the scientific objectives of a study, but who are at sub-
stantially higher risk of being harmed or experiencing
more severe harm, should be excluded from participation
on the basis of the risk-benefit requirement. If, however,
the treatment under investigation is likely to be used in
such patients, they should be included to learn how the
treatment affects them, thereby enhancing the social value
of the study ([1]; p. 2704). The method of specifying
norms has been developed as a means to resolve such
conflicts in a transparent and systematic way [2–4]. Ac-
cording to this method, establishing what follows from
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abstract, general values in concrete situations requires
specification of those values. Specification is an argu-
mentative process, where general norms are qualified
by “adding clauses indicating what, where, when, why,
by what means, by whom, or to whom an action is to
be, is not to be, or may be done” so as to arrive at a
more concrete interpretation about how best to honor
the commitment to the general norm ([2]; p 295).
Specifications are not fixed but not arbitrary either,
and depend on the particular context of the case and
the range of values that are taken into account [2].
When requirements do conflict, this does not result
by necessity from the concerning values, but from the
particular way these values were specified. The task,
then, is to identify those values and to develop alter-
native or further specifications of those values that
are plausible and acceptable, given the particularities
of the case, the range of values that are taken into
account, and the formal criteria of specification [2].
In this paper, the method of specifying norms will be
applied to the issue of participation of vulnerable pa-
tients in clinical research. It has been argued that vul-
nerable patients deserve special protection in the
context of clinical research, and that in many cases,
vulnerability may be a reason why participation of
such patients in clinical research is morally problem-
atic [5–8]. This is also reflected in the various guide-
lines that have been released on the issue.1 At the
same time, however, it has been pointed out that the
reasons why patients are vulnerable may differ, and
that this might affect our judgment of the propriety
of their participation in clinical research. Specifically,
a distinction has been made between consent-based
vulnerability, risk-based vulnerability and justice-based
vulnerability [9]. Consent-based vulnerability refers to
situations where patients lack the capacity to go
through the process of informed consent in the way
we would like them to do. Examples are young chil-
dren, and patients with advanced Alzheimer’s disease.
Risk-based vulnerability refers to situations where pa-
tients have certain characteristics which put them at
greater risk of sustaining harm from procedures that
are being tested - for example due to relevant co-
morbidity. Justice-based vulnerability refers to situa-
tions where participation in clinical research is un-
likely to be of future benefit to patients who are in
similar situations as the ones who are invited to par-
ticipate. An example is studies that are being con-
ducted in low and middle income countries that are
unlikely to gain access to the treatments that are be-
ing tested, should they prove beneficial.
The current paper provides an example of the second
class (risk-based vulnerability). It addresses the question
whether premenopausal women with atrial fibrillation
(AF) should participate in clinical studies of novel oral
anticoagulants (NOACs). By this, we do not wish to sug-
gest that women, generally, should be considered vulner-
able. In the context of the use of NOACs, however,
premenopausal women can be considered vulnerable, as
explained below. AF is a type of arrhythmia, leading to
the loss of effective contraction of the heart. The condi-
tion is known to increase the risk of ischemic stroke and
other types of thromboembolic events, which is the ra-
tionale for anticoagulation in these patients [10]. Vita-
min K antagonists (VKAs) have been the mainstay of
oral anticoagulation for decades [11]. However, these
drugs are considered cumbersome to use because of in-
teractions with food and drugs and because of the re-
quirement of frequent laboratory testing. This is deemed
to be a key reason for poor compliance and inadequate
anticoagulation [12]. Several attempts have been made
to develop safe and effective alternatives to VKAs. Of
these, dabigatran was the first NOAC to appear on the
market, and was associated with rates of ischemic stroke,
systemic embolism, and major hemorrhage that were
similar to those associated with VKAs [13]. Apixaban,
rivaroxaban and edoxaban quickly followed dabigatran
as successful alternatives to VKAs [14–16]. The phase
III trials on these four NOACs were conducted in pa-
tients with AF, aged 70–73 years, of which 60 to 65%
were male. This in spite of the fact that 60% of people
with AF are women and that women may sustain a
higher risk of bleeding from anticoagulation [17]. This
reflects the more generic phenomenon that women are
still underrepresented in many cardiovascular clinical
trials, while important gender differences are present
within most areas of heart disease [18].
The number of premenopausal women using oral
anticoagulation is increasing [19]. In a recent study
among patients with AF in daily care, dabigatran, relative
to warfarin, was associated with a higher risk of gastro-
intestinal and vaginal bleedings, but a lower risk of intra-
cranial bleedings [20]. Evidence suggests that among
premenopausal women, the risk of abnormal vaginal
bleeding is higher in case of dabigatran as compared to
warfarin [19]. In a small trial, it was found that rivaroxa-
ban is associated with twice as many abnormal uterine
bleeds as VKAs [21]. The issue is of particular signifi-
cance, since effective reversal strategies to stop the
bleeding exist for warfarin, but not for NOACs [22].
In sum, trial-based evidence exists, suggesting that
NOACs provide similar protection to elderly patients
with AF from thromboembolic events without incurring
greater risk of bleeding. These NOACs do not have the
practical disadvantages associated with conventional
treatment. At the same time, NOACs are being pre-
scribed in premenopausal women with AF, and evidence
is accumulating that in these patients, NOACs, as
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compared to conventional treatment, are associated with
greater risk of gastrointestinal and abnormal uterine
bleeding. Since no established means exist to stop such
bleedings, it is questionable whether in this group of pa-
tients the improved ease of use of NOACs outweighs the
associated risks. Moreover, the number of premeno-
pausal women with an indication for the use of NOACs
for AF and other indications is steadily increasing.
The objective of our paper is to address two questions:
1) Was it right to exclude premenopausal women with
AF from trial participation in the first place? 2) Now that
premenopausal women with AF were in fact excluded
from these studies, would further research on NOACs in
these women be warranted, and if so, what type of re-
search would be appropriate? To address these ques-
tions, the method of specifying norms was used, in
conjunction with the results of a Value of Information
(VoI) analysis. While the former is a formal model of
moral argumentation, the latter provides a framework
for incorporating the economic costs and benefits of
conducting research aimed at reducing uncertainty. It
can be considered as a means to inform the judgment
whether a proposed clinical study represents social
value, as defined by Emanuel et al. [1]. The two methods
are different approaches that can be used to assess for
concrete situations whether specific research is appropri-
ate from a moral and from an economic perspective, re-
spectively. We will argue that the results of the VoI
analysis can be incorporated in the wider framework, of-
fered by the method of specifying norms.
Main text
Specifying norms
Specifying norms is an established method of moral
argumentation [23]. It has been used to address issues
ranging from the management of serious incidental
findings in brain imaging research when consent for
disclosure is declined [24], to global development
[25]. In the following, we will illustrate the method of
specifying norms, using an abbreviated form of an ex-
ample presented by Richardson ([2], pp. 303–305).
The case consists of a severely malformed newborn
child, whose parents have indicated that it is their
sincere wish that the child should be allowed to die
by withholding nutrition and hydration. The first step
in the moral inquiry is to acknowledge that the case
presents an apparent moral dilemma. In the literature,
this has also been referred to as experiencing moral
perplexity: being uncertain as to what constitutes the
morally right thing to do or how to proceed in spe-
cific cases [26].2 The next step in the inquiry consists
of identifying the moral commitments that seem to
cause the uncertainty. Richardson proposes three
moral norms that are relevant to this particular case
and worthy of our commitment:
1. Generally speaking, it is wrong to kill innocent
persons.
2. Generally speaking, we should respect the
reasonable choices of parents regarding their
children (respecting parental autonomy).
3. Generally speaking, we should act in the best
interest of persons who have been entrusted to our
(professional) care.
The third step in the inquiry is to realize that there is
always a gap between general moral norms (such as re-
specting autonomy) and judgments as to what follows
from our commitment to such norm in concrete situa-
tions.3 An attractive way to bridge this gap is by making
the norm progressively more specific. There are multiple
ways of specifying a norm in a concrete situation, which
will depend on the specific context, but also and cru-
cially on the range of norms that are jointly taken into
consideration. The challenge is to develop specifications
that epitomize maximal coherence among our moral
commitments and between our commitments and the
decisions and actions we (propose to) take. In the ex-
ample, Richardson suggests that the inquiry might
proceed as follows:
Deliberators might come to realize that the first norm
(wrong to kill innocent persons) can in fact be con-
ceived as a specification of a still more general norm,
expressing respect for persons. This could prompt the
question ‘What is it about persons that make them
worthy of our respect?’.4 An answer to that question
could be: their self-consciousness. This could lead to
a re-specification of the first norm, reading: “It is
generally wrong to kill innocent people who have
attained self-consciousness or who have the potential
to develop self-consciousness over time.” If it can be
demonstrated (drawing on relevant empirical evi-
dence) that this is extremely unlikely in the current
case, our commitment to this norm would no longer
prohibit us from letting the child die. It would resolve
the dilemma, in the sense that it leads to a practical
recommendation that is consistent with the various
moral commitments that were identified. It is important
to note that if we were to take part in the deliberation and
bear responsibility for the decision, we would not be asked
to relinquish our commitment to the relevant general
norms. What would be required from us, is to develop
and consider multiple specifications of those commit-
ments in a way that is relevant to the case at hand and, in
doing so, strive for maximal coherence. Thus, the process
is characterised by an element of continuity, or stability, as
well as an element of flexibility. The process of specifying
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norms resists formalisation, and the outcome is not fixed
from the outset. In the example, for instance, if there
would be the prospect of some level of self-conscious life
(an empirical issue), the second norm could be re-
specified to read: “Generally speaking, we should respect
the reasonable choices of parents regarding their children
so long as they respect the children’s rights.” Defying the
parents’ choices in this particular case on those grounds
would, then, be consistent with the requirements of the
first norm. The example shows the crucial role of facts in
the deliberation, but also that the relevance of those facts
depends on the norms that are brought to bear on the
case. An important requirement of the argumentation is
that the normative force of the general norms is still cap-
tured in the specified versions. Arguably, acceptance of
proposed re-specifications of norms is something that
needs to be judged by those who are directly involved.
Thus, the argumentative model is formal, requiring the in-
put from those who are willing to join the deliberation.
The model can be considered to help structuring the de-
liberative process.
Value of information analysis
Value of Information (VoI) analysis is a method for
assisting decision making on the allocation of resources
to scientific research [27, 28]. The general idea is that
conducting research costs money, and that such money
can be used for other purposes as well. Hence, spending
money on research entails ‘opportunity costs’: benefits
that would result from alternative modes of spending
the money. Scientific research can be used to reduce un-
certainty on a particular issue, and uncertainty, too, can
incur costs. When we are forced to make decisions
under uncertainty, there is a probability of making the
wrong decision with its associated (societal) costs. Col-
lecting information through scientific research can, to
some extent, reduce that probability.
An example from the context of medical treatment is
the cesarean section. One may, for example question in
which cases this surgical procedure is appropriate. When
there is substantial uncertainty on this issue, both over-
and under-treatment are likely to occur, incurring sub-
stantial material and immaterial costs. Further research
may shed more light on the question in which cases a
cesarean section is likely to be beneficial to the mother
and the child. Conducting an appropriate empirical
study would be a sensible attempt to clarify the issue.
Such a study would cost money, but so does incorrectly
(not) conducting a cesarean section. The VoI analysis
provides a formal model to estimate and monetarise out-
comes of (not) conducting specific research. It puts the
various costs and benefits into a single, unifying analyt-
ical framework, informing the decision whether such
research would be a wise way of spending a community’s
resources.
Case study
We will now turn to the two central questions of our
paper, the first of which being:
Q1: Should premenopausal women with AF have been
included in trials of NOACs in the first place?
The method of specifying norms urges us to ask
whether in answering this question we must confront a
moral dilemma, and, if so, what moral commitments
seem to be responsible for the dilemma. In response to
this question, we suggest the following: at the time when
the trials were conducted, a reason for excluding pre-
menopausal women with AF from trials of NOACs may
have been that there was sufficient reason (although no
evidence) to believe that these women were at greater
risk (as compared to male patients or postmenopausal
women with AF) of sustaining (serious) side-effects. If
true, this would adversely affect their benefit-risk ratio:
the potential of harm resulting from trial participation
might not be outweighed by the potential for benefit.
Another reason for excluding them from such trial
might have been that they would have ‘diluted’ the trial:
with a more heterogeneous trial population it would
have been more difficult to demonstrate an added value
of NOACs as compared to conventional anti-
coagulation. This would have required a larger trial
population, leading to higher costs and presumably lon-
ger accrual period.
In contrast, a reason to include premenopausal women
with AF in the phase III trial on NOACs is that this
could have resulted in an evidential basis to guide the
future clinical management of these patients. Tenta-
tively, these considerations could be seen as specifica-
tions of the following norms:
1. Generally speaking, for prospective participants, the
overall benefit associated with trial participation
should outweigh the overall harm.
2. Generally speaking, treatments that are potentially of
added value should be made available to patients as
quickly as possible.
3. Generally speaking, treatments should not be offered
to patients (as opposed to study participants) unless
there is sufficient evidence that they are effective
and safe.
The third norm basically implies that, in the current
situation, premenopausal women with AF need to
accept that, even though there is an indication for
anticoagulation, they do not qualify for NOACs
(which do not entail the need for regular laboratory
testing), because there is reason to believe (although
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no hard evidence) that these substances might lead to
more (serious) bleedings that are difficult to control.
The norm may be considered to be a specification of
the more general norm ‘In dubio abstine’: in case of
doubt, do not proceed by using an intervention of
which you are not sure that it will do the patient
good and not harm her [29]. If we find this hard to
accept, it should urge us to also include such ‘vulner-
able’ patients in future trials. Can this, then, be made
coherent with the other two considerations? With re-
spect to the second norm, we would suggest that this
is an important consideration, but particularly in case
of patients suffering from a disease for which there is
currently no effective treatment. This is also the es-
sence of the novel policy of the European Medicines
Agency to ensure early access to medicines through
adaptive pathways [30]. The second norm might be
specified, then, by stipulating that this holds in case
of unmet medical needs only.
The first norm seems to express the notion that it
would be unreasonable, or perhaps even unfair, to expect
from premenopausal women with AF to participate in
trials of NOACs [1]. For, the most likely outcome would
be that this would reveal that indeed, NOACs cause
more, and more serious bleedings in these patients as
compared to other patients with AF. As such, it would
produce the evidential basis for the clinical management
of future premenopausal women with AF. Not only does
trial participation entail no benefit for participants them-
selves, it would also put them at risk of serious adverse
events. At this point of the deliberation, we might ask,
however, whether this would not be unduly paternalistic
[31]. Perhaps, patients should be allowed to make an in-
formed choice in this matter. If conventional treatment
is, in fact, experienced as quite cumbersome by a pa-
tient, and she is willing to accept the risk of bleeding,
should she then not be offered the choice to participate
in the trial? Indeed, patients might be willing to accept
the risk, and decide that they would like to contribute to
the further production of relevant evidence that can
serve to guide future clinical management. This could be
considered as a choice that is at least partially altruistic-
ally informed, and we should perhaps not deprive pa-
tients from making such choices [32]. What happens
here, in the argument, is that yet another norm has
come into view, to wit, the idea that we cannot com-
pletely rule out that persons sometimes wish to behave
from motives that are at least partially altruistic, and that
we should not prevent that from happening. It is up to
the deliberators to decide whether they wish to espouse
this idea, whether they consider it relevant to the
inquiry, and how it might affect the specification of the
first norm. For instance, the first norm could be re-
specified, reading ‘Generally speaking, for prospective
participants who are not altruistically motivated, the
overall benefit associated with trial participation should
outweigh the overall harm’. If deliberators would agree
that this is a reasonable way to achieve greater coher-
ence in their moral commitments through specifying
and re-specifying the various norms, this would suggest
that inclusion of premenopausal women with AF in tri-
als of NOACs would, in fact, have been the preferred
option.
Q2: Now that premenopausal women with AF have
been excluded from trials of NOACs, is further research
warranted?
We know that reality has taken a different course. As
a consequence, the question whether NOACs can be
considered a safe treatment for premenopausal women
with AF is as yet unresolved. Since we have tried to
argue that those patients should have been included in
those trials in the first place, there seems to be no good
reason why such a trial should not be warranted now.
However, the situation is somewhat different and an
additional question that might be asked is whether fur-
ther research in this area would constitute value for
money. After all, substantial resources have been spent
on clinical research of NOACs, and other areas of clin-
ical research may deserve higher priority. The question
is particularly relevant, given the recent reports in the
literature that there is an urgent need to increase value
and reduce waste in biomedical research [33]. Clearly,
this introduces yet another moral concern. If we are will-
ing to commit ourselves to this norm, further empirical
evidence is needed to answer the question whether con-
ducting research in this area would be consistent with
the objective of increasing value and reducing waste in
biomedical research.
One way of answering this question is by conducting a
VoI analysis. When applied to the case of NOACs in
premenopausal women with AF, such analysis reveals
that on the basis of the currently available evidence,
there is a 22% probability that for these patients, VKAs
is the preferred option [34]. It is estimated that this un-
certainty would translate into a monetary value of ap-
proximately 22 million Euros. Since the costs of
gathering further empirical evidence on this issue are
likely to be substantially lower, further research does
seem to be warranted, also from an economic point of
view. Since the key question seems to be whether
NOACs are safe for this subgroup of patients, rather
than whether they are effective, an observational study
may be the most appropriate design [35]. Of course, the
same conditions hold that were suggested above, of the
risks being controllable and, upon due information, ac-
ceptable to patients. In some settings, existing systems
for pharmacovigilance may suffice, whereas in other set-
tings it might be necessary to set up specific registries.
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Conclusions
We have tried to argue that premenopausal women with
AF could be considered a specific type of vulnerable pa-
tients, since they are at greater risk than other patients
with AF of sustaining abnormal, difficult to control
bleedings when exposed to NOACs. As such, the ques-
tion whether they should be allowed to participate in tri-
als of those drugs needs careful consideration. Using the
method of specifying norms, we have argued that the
participation of these patients, under certain conditions,
is morally defensible, indeed morally preferable to their
exclusion from those trials. We have also tried to show
that an economic analysis such as a VoI can be incorpo-
rated in such argument. It provides estimates of empir-
ical data that are relevant, once we have espoused a
moral norm such as the increase of value and the reduc-
tion of waste in biomedical research [1]. Our conclusion
can be considered as a specific example of including vul-
nerable patients in pragmatic trials, a conclusion that
was also recently advocated by Welch et al. [36].
Various approaches have been developed to help re-
solve ethical dilemmas in a systematic and transparent
way, including specifying norms, casuistry, wide reflect-
ive equilibrium, and balancing. A comparison between
these approaches is well beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice to conclude, perhaps, by stating that presumably
the most valuable aspect of a method such as specifying
norms lies in relating our daily behavior to norms that
we have reason to value. In using the method, these
norms acquire practical significance. At the same time,
the moral significance of our daily behavior is revealed.
It does so in a way that recognizes and tries to preserve
the non-determinate character of our daily affairs and
our interpretations thereof. It does so in a way that ac-
cepts that moral dilemmas are a fact of life, and that it is
rational to seek maximal coherence in our moral com-
mitments. And it does so in a way that is transparent
and that can be shared. As such, it should also prove
valuable to committees that have formally been granted
the authority to review trial protocols and proposals for
scientific research.
Endnotes
1e.g., the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical
Association, the International Ethical Guidelines for Bio-
medical Research Involving Human Subjects from the
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sci-
ences, and the report on Ethical and Policy Issues in Re-
search Involving Human Participants from the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission.
2Such uncertainty may reside within one person, or
may arise from conflicting understandings among per-
sons (‘conflicting certainties’).
3This part of a moral argument has also been referred
to as explication of moral norms, which provides an an-
swer to the question: what follows from our commit-
ment to this norm in this specific situation? [26]
4This part of a moral argument has also been referred
to as the rationale of moral norms, which provides an
answer to the question: why should we be committed to
this norm in the first place? [26]
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